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What is there new to say on the Low countries and transatlantic relations 
during the cold War? how do recent trends in cold War research open up 
uncharted areas to explore these relations from new angles and perspectives? 
With attention shifting to cultural, global, transnational and multi-centric 
approaches to the international history of the twentieth century, it would seem 
that the transatlantic is long passé as a primary frame of reference. As the first 
special issue in this series claimed (the Low countries and Eastern Europe 
during the cold War), existing scholarship on the Benelux nations has tended 
to emphasise the ‘loyal ally’ thesis, the uniqueness of small states among 
larger powers and the importance of traditional diplomacy. With this special 
issue, a set of articles has been brought together that open up new ways to 
consider the changing relations both within and between the Benelux nations 
and their Western allies during the cold War. As a starting point, it takes the 
dual approach of the Benelux nations as both actors in the cold War and as 
sites where cold War dynamics were played out and influenced local political 
and social outcomes. By applying such a structure-agency approach, new 
perspectives on the importance of the cold War for Benelux history, and the 
relevance of the Benelux for cold War history, can be mapped out.
KEYWORDS:  Global Cold War, European Integration, Transatlantic Relations.
The Cold War is something of an elusive entity in terms of its lasting impact on public 
memory in Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Whereas the impervious bunkers 
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of the Atlantikwall will continue to dot the coastal areas for many years to come, the 
Cold War has left little comparable behind. Holger Nehring has pointed out how nuclear 
bunkers ‘remind us of how the Cold War was quite literally dug into the landscape’, 
but much of this architecture remains hidden from view, enhancing the sense that the 
Cold War, as opposed to WW II, did not leave any lasting visible traces.1 This anomaly 
stretches further than architecture and landscape. Politically and socially, the East–West 
contest was experienced as a day-to-day reality over several decades, the level of tension 
varying with each crisis. The Benelux nations were founding members of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization and orientated their security policies around it in order to 
oppose the Soviet Union. Their governments – and in particular, key individuals such 
as Paul-Henri Spaak, Joseph Luns, Pierre Harmel and Max van der Stoel – acted over 
several decades to maintain the alliance and strengthen the bonds between the various 
nations, and above all, between North America and Western Europe. Yet the Cold War’s 
impact in the Benelux nations has generally been taken for granted or downplayed in 
relation to other more important factors such as decolonisation or European integration. 
There is one major title that covers the political, social and cultural dimensions of Cold 
War Belgium; no comparable volume exists for the Netherlands, with the exception of 
a recent volume on Dutch–Belgian relations since 1940. Dutch historians tend to focus 
on the long transatlantic history that has linked the US with the Netherlands.2
As the introduction to the first special issue noted, three themes dominate the existing 
Cold War historiography of the Low Countries. Firstly, the assumption that they consist-
ently acted as ‘loyal allies’ of the United States. Secondly, that despite being small powers 
they still maintained a unique significance in international affairs. Thirdly, that the focus 
has remained primarily on traditional diplomacy and foreign policy. This has produced 
a body of work that is impressive in depth but rather limited and self-congratulatory in 
scope. Foreign policies have been characterised as following in a tradition – in the Dutch 
case, a strong leaning towards free trade, moralism, and the search for balance between 
greater powers (which for many years took the form of neutrality).3 Belgium is seen as a 
nation of merchants that is focused on Europe (and particularly France and Germany), 
an attitude stemming from its uncertain beginnings as a neutral nation among the great 
powers in 1830. Similarly, the failure to develop a coherent Africa policy after 1960 is seen 
as the continuation of a policy whereby the Belgian state – which reluctantly acquired 
the Congo from King Leopold II in 1908 – limited itself to supporting companies in the 
Congo.4 The myth that Belgium has always been a supporter of European supranation-
alism has also been successfully debunked in recent years.5
These debates have narrowed the field for critical investigation, since socio-economic 
and political phenomena that fall outside the free trade/morality/neutrality triumvirate 
can easily be side-lined as anomalies. What is more, foreign policy does not cover for-
eign relations, while a traditional diplomatic history approach ignores the multifarious 
cross-border activities of individuals, social movements and multinationals that cannot 
be contained – and do not always conform to – a view of the world emitted by a Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. Research on transnationalism and non-state actors in Belgium, while 
excellent, is catalogued as social history and therefore rarely explicitly engages with Cold 
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War studies.6 As a result, the Cold War as a topic is narrowed to an orthodox story that 
seems exhausted as a research field: the major crises have been covered, the diplomatic 
record transcribed and the case is more or less closed. These special issues reject that view.
The Cold War has largely been regarded as one such anomaly that caused unnecessar-
ily hysterical and dramatic outbursts that do not need to be taken too seriously.7 Thus, 
Duco Hellema ends his study of the Dutch response to the events in Hungary in late 1956 
with the unremarkable comment that ‘little was actually achieved by the Netherlands …. 
The Netherlands and Dutch anti-communism were, therefore, not very relevant to the 
Hungarian revolution’.8 From this perspective, the Cold War was something that was 
tolerated and endured, but not really engaged with. It happened ‘somewhere else’. In 
Belgium, Marc Lamot succinctly summarised that view when he defined the Cold War as 
‘white noise,’ something that shaped but never affected Belgian decision-making which 
was preoccupied with economic and political interests.9 Hellema has further claimed 
that while the superpower confrontation did influence Dutch politics and society, ‘the 
Netherlands were actually rarely involved with major conflicts in world politics’.10 The 
nuclear threat was present, but there was no credible defence against it other than rely-
ing on the Americans.11 The crises that directly affected national interest were colonial: 
Indonesia, New Guinea and the Congo. In each case, so the claim goes, the ‘loyal ally’ 
stance was severely tested as the United States opposed the long-term aims of The Hague 
and Brussels, but the damage was never irreparable. Nonetheless, the full impact of 
decolonisation still needs to be gauged since those conflicts exposed the limits of what 
Geir Lundestad called the ‘importance of a common ideology and culture’ in cementing 
the Trans-Atlantic partnership. While US policymakers identified themselves with their 
nation’s anticolonial beginnings and pursued a modernising agenda, the European con-
tinent still clung to its civilising mission.12
Socially and politically, it is hard to see how the Cold War did not transform the every-
day experience of the Benelux nations. The political left was faced with the dilemma of 
dealing with a demonised totalitarian version of ‘actually existing socialism,’ causing the 
social democratic parties to distance themselves from the communists and preventing a 
reformist united front against the forces of capital.13 The communists, meanwhile, became 
a target for state apparatuses (and, in the early years, their alleged paramilitary allies) 
unwilling to accept treason and the possibility of sabotage in their midst. The lines of 
political legitimacy were redrawn by Cold War tensions, and then policed by exclusion, 
subterfuge and occasional violence. The essay here by Emmanuel Gerard on the murder 
of Jules Lahaut indicates the extent to which irregular right-wing forces were prepared to 
settle local scores in the name of the ‘Cold War struggle’. Although the Netherlands did 
not experience political assassination during the Cold War, similar sentiments did exist. 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Dutch state still needed to enforce its monopoly 
of violence against groups determined to take the anti-communist (and pro-colonial) 
campaign into their own hands.14
The fractures in society wrought in quick succession by world war, decolonisation, 
and enforced post-war ideological re-alignments went deep, as the (largely still clas-
sified) files of the intelligence and security services indicate. The documents of the 
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Belgian ‘Staatsveiligheid’ are completely classified, although special access has been 
granted for specific investigations (such as on the Lahaut murder). A section of the 
Dutch Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst archive was publically released in 2015.15 These 
documents, mainly covering the years 1946–52, were a major step towards transparency 
in this respect, but this has occurred in the teeth of long-running delays, bureaucratic 
obstacles and an unwillingness on the part of the state to open up its past. Some fractures 
must remain hidden – something that was also heavily indicated by the refusal in late 
2012 to countenance a full historical investigation by the Netherlands Institute of War 
Documentation into the scale of violence and atrocities committed during the Indonesian 
war of independence.16 Of course, such resistance to full disclosure has been encoun-
tered in France, Britain and other nations – it is a natural response of states to keep their 
secrets. What is most remarkable about the Netherlands and Belgium, however, is the 
degree to which this openness is still, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, so 
reluctant. In the Dutch case, this indicates how deep the self-perception of a small state 
bound by a strong moral code really is: ‘The Dutch are used to imagining their society 
and its history as peaceful, well-balanced, consensual and convivial, non-violent, equal, 
democratic and tolerant: in brief, a society without history in the cruel or heroic sense of 
the word’.17 The recent uproar caused by the UN investigating the ‘Black Pete’ figure for 
racism only confirms this further on a wider social level. In Belgium, there is a concern 
that unwelcome revelations could adversely affect diplomatic ties, since Brussels is home 
to so many international and European institutions.18
The frame for this particular special issue is set by the interconnected themes of sites 
and actors. Sites, in the sense that the Benelux nations in their own particular ways were 
locations – political, economic, social – where the wider forces of the Cold War contest 
influenced and interacted with local interests. To paraphrase Welsh historian Martin 
Johnes, this means ‘looking at events like … the atomic bomb that had no specifically 
[Belgian, Dutch or Luxembourgish] dimensions but impacted on [the Benelux] none-
theless …. They also demand that we consider national histories through international 
perspectives’.19 The pressures of abiding by the demands of a military alliance, of policing 
political legitimacy, and of persuading publics of the merits of the anti-communist cause 
all needed to be met. A similar approach can, therefore, be applied to smaller states in 
both West and East, in terms of how they functioned as ‘test cases’ for the ideological 
demands of the superpowers – and how they still managed to forge their own identities 
and interests within this matrix.20 In the West, American political, economic and cul-
tural interests were dominant, but they were also appropriated, remade and remodelled 
by local forces according to their local (and/or parochial) interests.21 Recent work on 
how the Dutch political and military elites created a propaganda apparatus to promote 
moral resilience domestically indicates how far old traditions of state non-intervention 
were undermined by new concerns about the impact of austerity and possible unrest in 
society at large.22
Relations with other powers also needed to be reset, both formally and informally. For 
a brief period after WW II, some – such as future Nobel Prize winner Jan Tinbergen, 
and Paul Henri Spaak – called for a ‘Third Way’ between the free market system of the 
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United States and the collectivism of the Soviet Union. “We do not need to set our goals 
according to either of these great extremes,” Tinbergen wrote, “[w]e must be ourselves, 
and follow our own path.”23 The communist world looked to promote its value-sys-
tem abroad, creating new encounters and clashes of ideals.24 The loss of control over 
the principal colonies within fifteen years after WW II caused deep concerns not only 
about economic damage and the loss of natural resources, but also about the enforced 
regrounding of the post-colonial metropole that this would require. The Dutch could fear 
sinking to the same level as lowly Denmark, but even Denmark still had Greenland. In 
Brussels, the loss of the so-called exemplary colony (modelkolonie) was seen as an insult, 
and when the province of Katanga seceded under the leadership of Moïse Tshombe, the 
Eyskens government offered it support in defiance of the new authorities in Leopoldville.25
Ties with the United States were deepened structurally through NATO and the 
European Recovery Program, and this was not a meeting of equals. As David J. Snyder 
argues in his essay, this reordering of relations was far more complex than a simple 
assessment of unequal material power capabilities would suggest. This investigation of 
the fuller meanings of ‘clientilism’ cuts across established interpretations such as ‘empire 
by invitation’, ‘politics of productivity’, ‘market empire’, ‘empire of fun’ and ‘empire 
of liberty’ that have so far set the frame for interpreting the post-WW II transatlantic 
dynamic.26
This leads into the theme of agency. The demands of alliance politics and ideologi-
cal consensus opened up possibilities for states – particularly smaller or weaker states, 
paradoxically enough – to pursue interests in the international system through irregular 
means. The orthodox interpretation of the international system as being driven by the 
interests of the great powers alone is too narrow and simplistic. Political, economic 
and military cooperation can enable smaller states to function as ‘secondary centers of 
power’, negotiating and obtaining benefits from this relationship.27 The Netherlands 
may be ‘your average small country’ according to most criteria, but it has also been the 
site of some of the largest multinationals, the busiest port and substantial outward and 
inward investments – particularly to and from the United States.28 The assistance of both 
Belgium and the Netherlands in the aftermath of the French withdrawal from NATO’s 
military command in 1966 is illustrative of such assistance for maintaining US strate-
gic infrastructure in Western Europe. Luxembourg’s hilly terrain made it an important 
redoubt in the trans-European stay-behind networks of Gladio, and Belgium is the site 
of perhaps the most lasting Gladio mystery with the so-called ‘Bende van Nijvel’.29 No 
less than Dutch Foreign Minister Norbert Schmelzer (1971–73) declared that it was a 
question of context, vision and will:
the possibility for a small state to play a role is set by objective factors, such as the constel-
lation of world politics at a given moment; the actual role depends on the way in which one 
grasps the chance to use these existing possibilities.30
Of course, this could also lead into a blending of national and international (read: 
transatlantic) interests, as if the two were synonymous. In the security field, this is best 
illustrated by the Belgian and Dutch determination to obtain American aircraft in the 
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face of cheaper alternatives from Dassault and Saab – a tendency that has continued 
long after the end of the Cold War with debate surrounding the purchase of the Joint 
Strike Fighter.31 But national interests obviously did not disappear, and both Belgium 
and the Netherlands attempted to influence their more powerful ally across the Atlantic 
through concerted public diplomacy campaigns, as Frank Gerits’ essay shows.32 If issues 
of major national importance were at stake, determined efforts were made to overcome 
their weaker positions by utilising alternative levers of influence in Washington.33 Talk 
of ‘asymmetry,’ therefore, needs to be nuanced with a subtler understanding of the scope 
of diplomacy between smaller and larger powers.34
Having said that, it is important not to over-play any claims to uniqueness. Willem 
Frijhoff has commented that the national frame of reference has often been avoided 
by historians unconvinced of its merits: ‘The Dutch cannot really afford to keep their 
awareness of the past within their own boundaries’.35 Luxembourg only achieved full 
independence in 1867; from 1815 to 1830, Belgium and the Netherlands were one political 
unit. History has seen the redrawing of the boundaries between them on multiple occa-
sions. Nevertheless, out of this fluid existence have come persistent, pervasive self-images. 
Belgium and Luxembourg have always been acutely aware of their modest size and vul-
nerability. The Netherlands on the other hand, for Frijhoff, still ‘cultivates great memo-
ries and rather lofty ambitions’, not least via the pretensions of the gidsland motif of a 
nation setting standards for others in tolerance and civic freedoms.36 This veers towards 
reductionism, and as the essay of Alexander Reinfeldt shows, there have been different 
‘national self-images’ for different groups, and they are not static. The Netherlands’ 
‘amphibious character’ – partly continental, partly oceanic – has also contributed to 
contrasting perceptions, interests and group dynamics in politics and society.37 Belgium 
has been linguistically and culturally divided since its inception, and Cees Wiebes and 
Bert Zeeman demonstrated that there was no Dutch–Belgian transatlantic consensus 
in the early Cold War period whatever the presumptions of the Benelux concept have 
led us to believe.38 In the 1970s, the focus was on how an identifiable elite defined the 
course and temper of foreign policy;39 since then more attention has been given to the 
alternative cross-border bottom-up linkages of social movements. Matthijs van Beek’s 
essay explores this in detail here.
National self-images are certainly not the sole domain of the elites – and neither are 
the elites a single unit. During the Cold War, there were various cases of Dutch civil 
servants aligning with their counter-parts in the United States against the designs of 
their own ministers.40 Forms of ‘entrepreneurial diplomacy’ that cross through, over, and 
alongside official channels are an important (and often neglected) element to Benelux 
diplomatic history, as Giles Scott-Smith argues. Reference to the vital Dutch input into 
the Bilderberg meetings should be enough to confirm that point.41 Ten years ago, Tity 
de Vries investigated why there were so few Dutch intellectuals in the anti-Stalinist trans-
national networks of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and concluded that the most 
likely candidates already possessed their own active international connections.42
In short, while the Dutch adhered to a determined Atlanticism and entertained the 
notion of a middle-power, Belgium and Luxembourg felt that as small nations their 
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interests would be better served by support for the European integration process. 
Nonetheless the Benelux as a site of the Cold War was characterised by a host of com-
monalities: the long-term impact of decolonisation, the subtle but real effects of the Cold 
War on everyday life and domestic policies, the constant need to renegotiate positions 
within the transatlantic framework.43 From these perspectives, the Benelux nations are 
not so much gidslanden as schakellanden – connecting nations, significant nodes of 
transit and traffic that are useful for, and that make use of, the intentions and interests of 
others, be they in the West, South or East. It is these connections that this special issue, 
together with its predecessor, seeks to emphasise, elucidate, and explore, in the process 
hopefully laying out paths for future research into the Cold War Benelux.
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